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Abstract—Revocation is an important feature of
group signature schemes. Verifier Local Revoca-
tion (VLR) is a popular revocation mechanism
that involves only verifiers in the revocation
process. In VLR, a revocation list is maintained
to store the information about revoked users.
The verification cost of VLR based schemes is
linearly proportional to the size of the revoca-
tion list. In many applications, the size of the
revocation list grows with time, which makes the
verification process expensive. In this paper, we
propose a lattice based dynamic group signature
using VLR and time bound keys to reduce
the size of the revocation list to speed up the
verification process. In the proposed scheme, an
expiration date is fixed for signing key of each
group member, and verifiers can find out (at
constant cost) if a signature is generated using
an expired key. Hence revocation information
of members who are revoked before signing key
expiry date (premature revocation) are kept in
the revocation list, and other members are part
of natural revocation. This leads to a significant
saving on the revocation check by assuming
natural revocation accounts for a large fraction
of the total revocation. This scheme also takes
care of non-forgeability of signing key expiry
date.
Keywords– Lattice based cryptography; dy-
namic group signatures; verifier local revocation;
time bound keys
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of group signatures was introduced by Chaum
and Van Heyst [1]. In a group signature scheme, a set
of potential signers (called members of group), each with
their own secret key form a group. Each member in the
group can anonymously issue a signature on behalf of
the whole group i.e., the identity of the member is not
revealed (anonymity). However, in cases of any disputes
with a signature, the identity of the corresponding signer
can be found using a tracing mechanism (traceability).
Group membership is handled by a designated authority
called group manager. Tracing of the signature is han-
dled by an independent opening authority or the group
manager itself.
The first rigorous security model for a static setting
was given by Bellare, Micciancio, and Warinschi in [2].
In the static model, all the potential group members are
fixed in the setup phase itself. Subsequently, Bellare,
Shi, and Zhang [3] and Kiayias, Agelos and Yung [4]
proposed a partially dynamic model, where users can
join the group at any time (member registration), but
once they have done so, they cannot leave the group.
Also, there are schemes in which members can only be re-
voked at any time, but cannot join after the group setup
phase. Even this model is considered partially dynamic.
Whereas in dynamic model members can be registered
and revoked from the group at any time.
So an important functionality of dynamic group sig-
natures is revocation, which supports removing mem-
bers from the group anytime. The most commonly
used revocation mechanism is Verifier Local Revocation
(VLR) proposed by Boneh and Shacham [5]. In the VLR
scheme, a signer is not part of the revocation process,
only a verifier is involved in the revocation process. A
revocation list RL is maintained by the group manager
which contains information about the revoked members.
The group manager keeps a revocation token for each
member of the group. Whenever a member is revoked,
his revocation token is kept in RL. To check if a signer
of signature is revoked or not, the verifier runs the re-
vocation check procedure for all the revocation tokens in
RL. Hence, the signature verification algorithm consists
of two steps
• Validation check: To check whether the signature is
generated by a member of the group or not.
• Revocation check: To check that the signed member
is revoked or not (by using RL).
Group signature schemes with VLR are used in many
real-life applications like online medical services [6],
anonymous authentication in wireless sensor networks
[7], anonymous online communication [8], remote bio-
metric authentication [9], privacy preserving inter vehicle
communications in vehicular ad hoc network (VANET)
[10]. In the above applications, members will be part of
the group for a certain period, after that they will be
revoked. In such scenarios, RL size grows significantly
with the passage of time. It is clearly observed that the
computation cost of the revocation check is linearly pro-
portional to the size of RL. This motivates us to reduce
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the size of RL, which in turn reduces the verification
cost.
Chu, Liu, Huang, and Zhou [11] proposed a VLR based
group signature scheme (using bilinear- pairing) to re-
duce the verification cost. They used the concept of time
bound keys, where an expiration date τ is set to each
member signing key. Along with proving membership of
the group, a signer has to prove that his expiration date
is not passed i.e., tc < τ , where tc is the present date.
Hence a member whose expiration date τ has passed can-
not generate a signature that is successfully validated by
the verification algorithm. This type of revocation is
called “natural” revocation i.e, members whose signing
key has expired. In case a signer needs to be revoked be-
fore the expiration date τ , his revocation tokens are kept
in RL. This type of revocation is called “premature”
revocation. Now, a verifier needs to run the revocation
check only for the prematurely revoked members.
All the schemes discussed above becomes insecure
once quantum computers are realized. It is conjectured
that cryptographic schemes based on lattices are re-
sistant against quantum computers. Unlike classical
cryptography (based on hardness of discrete log problem
or factoring problem), lattice based cryptography enjoys
provable security based on worst-case hardness assump-
tions [12] [13] [14]. This necessitates the construction of
secure and efficient cryptographic schemes using lattices.
Lattice based Group Signatures. In 2010, Gordon,
Katz, and Vaikuntanathan [15] constructed the first lat-
tice based group signature where both the signature size
and group public key size are linear in number of group
members. Camenisch, Jan and Neven [16] improved the
work of [15] to achieve stronger anonymity using at-
tribute token system. In [17] an efficient scheme was
constructed where the sizes of both group public key and
signature were proportional to logN . However, all the
above are static schemes, which do not support member
registration or revocation. In 2014, [18] constructed the
first group signature scheme with revocation using VLR
mechanism, which achieves almost the same asymptoti-
cal efficiency as [17]. But this scheme does not support
member registration. In [19] a static group signature
scheme was constructed, which is efficient by a logN
factor in group public key and signature size compared
to previous schemes [18][17]. The work of [19] was im-
proved in [20] [21] by including VLR based revocation
to their construction. Still, this scheme is partially dy-
namic which does not support member registration. In
[22] first VLR based dynamic group signature scheme was
constructed, but the sizes of both public key and secret
key are similar to [18], which is inefficient compared to
[19] [20]. In [23] a signature scheme that facilitates only
member registration was constructed but it does not sup-
port revocation.
In the above discussed VLR based schemes, verification
cost is proportional to the size of RL. This leads to the
following open questions: i) Is it possible to reduce the
size of RL? ii) Is it possible to construct a lattice based
dynamic group signature scheme using VLR and reduced
key size?
A. Contribution
In this work, we address all the above issues by construct-
ing a new lattice based dynamic group signature scheme
using VLR. We use the concept of time bound keys sim-
ilar to [11], to reduce the size of RL. Compared to the
previous lattice based VLR group signature schemes, our
scheme has the following advantages.
• Our scheme significantly reduces the size of the re-
vocation list because of natural revocation.
• Vertification cost of our scheme is less because of the
reduced size of the revocation list.
• The size of the public key and the secret key is effi-
cient by logN compared to the schemes in [18] and
[22].
• Unlike [11], our scheme takes care of non-forgeability
of secret key expiration date τ i.e, no member with
τ as signing key expiration date can generate a valid
signature after τ has passed.
A detailed comparison our scheme and with the exist-
ing lattice based VLR group signature schemes is shown
in the Table 1. Here, λ is the security parameter,
n = O(λ), N is the maximum number of members in
the group, m and q are the parameters polynomial in n
and l = logN . |Rpre| denotes the number of prema-
turely revoked members, and |RL| denotes the number
of revoked members or size of the revocation list. We
know, |Rpre| << |RL| in many scenarios.
Table 1: Comparision of Lattice based VLR group
signature schemes
Scheme [18] [20] [21] [22] Our Scheme
gpk size O(nml log q) O(nm log q) O(nm log q) O(nml log q) O(nm log q)
sk size O(ml log q) O(m log q) O(m log q) O(ml log q) O(m log q)
Revocation
List size
|RL| |RL| |RL| |RL| |Rpre|
Verification
cost












All matrices are denoted by bold upper-case letters such
as A, and vectors are denoted by bold lower-case letters,
such as u . All the vectors are assumed to be in column
form. For A ∈ Zn×m and B ∈ Zp×m, row concatenation
is denoted by [A||B ] ∈ Z(n+p)×m. For A ∈ Zn×m and
B ∈ Zn×p, column concatenation is denoted by [A|B ] ∈
Zn×(m+p). AT indicates the transpose of matrix A, and
A−1 indicates the inverse of matrix A. Denote the l2 and
l∞ norm by ‖ · ‖ and ‖ · ‖∞ , respectively. The norm of
a matrix A ∈ Zn×m with columns (ai)mi=1 is defined as
the norm of its longest column (i.e., ‖A‖ = maxi‖a i‖).
If the columns of A = (a1,a2, . . . ,am) are linearly in-
dependent, let Ã = (ã1, ã2, . . . , ãm) denote the Gram-
Schmidt Orthogonalization of vectors a1,a2, . . . ,am in
the same order. For a finite set S, sampling a value x ac-
coding to distribution D is denoted by x←↩ DS . The set
of integers {1, 2, . . . , n} is denoted by [n], for any integer
n ≥ 1 .
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B. VLR Group Signature Using Time Bound Keys
The construction of our scheme is similar to [23], and
the concept of time bound keys from [11] is used in our
scheme. A trusted third party runs a Setup algorithm to
fix public parameters and group manager secret key. A
user who wants to be a potential group member involves
in an interactive join protocol with the group manager.
After successful join, the member gets a secret key (or
signing key) with an expiration date τ , a group mem-
bership certificate, and a revocation token. The member
can generate signatures on messages as long as τ is not
expired. It is necessary to hide τ from verifiers to main-
tain the privacy of the group members. To achieve this,
the member selects an intermediate signature expiration
date t (public) for each signature and proves in zero-
knowledge that t < τ . During the verification process,
the verifier checks if the current date tc is no later than
the signature expiration date t. If that is true following
condition holds tc ≤ t < τ . Thus, the verifier is sure that
the signature is generated by a non-expired signing key.
However, a verifier can still check if signature is gener-
ated by an old (secret key expired) group member even
after the expiration date τ .
Different date formats such as “YYYYMMDD” or
“YYMMDD” or “YYMM” in integer can be used to rep-
resent a date. If we take “YYMMDD” date format, then
t = 210101 means 01 January 2021, τ = 210311 means
11 March 2021, it can be easily seen that t < τ .
The definition of VLR group signature with time
bound keys is taken from [11]. It consists of the following
algorithms.
• Setup(λ,N, d): On input security parameter λ ∈
N, the maximum number of members in a group N
and a date format d this algorithm and outputs the
group public-key (gpk) and a group manager secret
key (gmsk). Group manager receives the gmsk.
• Join: It is an interactive protocol between user
i (denoted Ui) and group manager(denoted GM)
. Ui takes as input gpk, a digital signature pub-
lic key, secret key pair (upk[i], usk[i]) . GM takes
gpk, gmsk, τi (secret key expiration date for user
Ui). At the end of the protocol Ui fixes its secret
(signing) key seci, and obtains a membership cer-
tificate certi, and a revocation token grti from the
GM . Transcripts of this communication are stored
in transcripts database by GM . It is a private
database containing transcripts of communication
between GM and Ui of all the group members. Each
transcript in transcripts also contains coin tosses
used by the GM during execution of join algorithm.
• Sign(gpk,m , seci, certi, t): On input gpk, a mes-
sage m ∈ {0, 1}∗, secret-key seci, membership cer-
tificate certi, signature expiration date t this algo-
rithm generates the signature Σ on m .
• Verify(gpk,m ,Σ, tc, RL): On input gpk, a message
m ∈ {0, 1}∗, signature Σ, current date tc and revo-
cation list RL, this algorithm returns 1 if Σ is valid
signature on m , else return 0.
• Open(gpk,m ,Σ, RL): On input a message m ∈
{0, 1}∗, a valid signature Σ on m , RL, this algorithm
outputs an index i ∈ [N ] or a special symbol ⊥ in
case of opening failure.
C. Correctness
Correctness guarantees that for a group signature Σ gen-
erated with signature expiration time t, by a non revoked
signer i, whose secret key expiration date is τi and t < τi.
Σ is valid and the opening correctly identifies the signer
i.
Definition 1. ∀ d, t, tc, τi, RL,m ∈ {0, 1}∗,
(gpk, gmsk)←Setup(λ,N, d), (seci, certi, grti, τi)←Join,
we have Verify(gpk,m,Σ, tc, RL) = 1 ⇐⇒ grti /∈
RL and tc ≤ t < τi
D. Security Definitions
For security model, we follow the definitions of [24] in-
stead of [11]. Because security definitions of [24] are
tighter and they consider non-forgeability of expiration
date τ for traceability.
A group signature scheme is secure if it is secure
against traceability, selfless-anonymity and framing
attacks. In all of these attacks, an adversary A is given
access to oracles which share few variables. Both shared
variables and oracles are explained below.
Variables:
• Hu: Set of honest members in the group
• Cu: Set of corrupted members in the group
• Sigs: All the signing queries made by A are stored
in this set.
Oracles:
• Adduser: This oracle allows A to add honest user
to the group. On input (i, τi), this oracle com-
putes seci, certi, grti by running Join algorithm lo-
cally and i is added to Hu.
• Qgm : This oracle allows A to act as a corrupt user
i, and engage in join protocol. After successful join
A gets seci, τi, certi, grti and i is added to Cu.
• Quser: This oracle allows A to act as a corrupted
group manager and engage in join protocol with a
hones user i. After successful join i is added to Hu.
• Getreg: On input index i, this oracle returns ⊥ if i
does not exist. Otherwise it returns (grti, τi)
• Revoke: This oracles allow A to revoke honest
users. On input index i, this oracle adds grti to
revocation list RL.
• Gsign: On input i,m , and t signing oracle returns
the signature Σ on m with signature expiration date
t. Further (m ,Σ, t) is added to Sigs.
• Getgmsk: This oracle returns the gmsk to A.
• Getusk: On input index i, it returns ⊥ if i does not
exist. Otherwise it returns (seci, certi) and adds i
to Cu.
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1) Traceability
In this attack, an adversary A is allowed to control a
set of users in the group through Qgm queries. Ad-
versary is also allowed to observe the system dur-
ing addition of users and signature generation through
Adduser, Gsign, Getreg, Revoke queries. Finally, A has
to produce the signature that is not opened to a user
controlled by the A or forge the secret key expiration
date. It is clearly explained in the below experiment.
Definition 2. For security parameter λ and any PPT
adversary A, traceability experiment ExptraceA (λ) is de-
fined as follows.
ExptraceA (λ) :
(gpk, gmsk)← Setup(λ,N, d); Cu := ∅; Sigs := ∅;
(m,Σ, t, RL)← A(Qgm, Adduser, Getreg, Revoke,Gsign)
Return 1 if conditions ((1) ∧ (2)) ∨ ((1) ∧ (3)) are
satisfied.
(1)Verify(gpk,m,Σ, tc, RL) = 1 ∧ (m,Σ, t) /∈ Sigs
(2)i← Open(gpk,m,Σ, RL) ∧ (i =⊥ ∨ i /∈ Cu\RL)
(3)τi < t
Otherwise return 0;
We say that our scheme is traceable if the advan-
tage
AdvtraceA (λ) := |Pr[ExptraceA (1λ)] = 1| is negligible for A.
2) Non-frameability
In this attack, A can corrupt the group manager through
Getgmsk query and add a set of honest users to the group
through Quser queries. A is also allowed to make sign-
ing queries through Gsign, get secret key of honest users
via Getusk query, and get registration details via Getreg
query. Finally, adversary has to produce a signature that
is not queried earlier using Gsign query and opened to a
honest non-revoked user. It is clearly explained in the
below experiment.
Definition 3. For security parameter λ and any
PPT adversary A, non-frameability experiment
Expnon−frameA (λ) is defined as follows.
Expnon−frameA (λ) :
(gpk, gmsk)← Setup(λ,N, d);
Hu := ∅; Cu := ∅; Sigs := ∅;
(m,Σ, t, RL, i)← A(Quser, Getgmsk, Getusk, Getreg,
Gsign) ;
Return 1 if conditions (1) ∧ (2) ∧ (3) are satisfied.
(1)Verify(gpk,m,Σ, gpk, tc, RL) = 1
(2)i← Open(gpk,m,Σ, RL) ∧ (i =⊥ ∨ i /∈ Cu\RL)
(3)(i ∈ Hu) ∧ (i /∈ Cu\RL) ∧ ((m,Σ, t) /∈ Sigs)
Otherwise return 0;
We say that our scheme is non-frameable if the advantage
Advnon−fraA (λ) := |Pr[Exp
non−fra
A (λ)] = 1|
is negligible for A.
3) Selfless-Anonymity
In this attack, A operates in two stages: play and guess.
In the play stage, A is allowed to introduce honest users
using Adduser query, get the secret key of honest users
via Getusk query, make signing queries through Gsign,
revoke users through Revoke queries. At the end of the
first stage, A returns a challenge message and two non-
revoked identities (i0, i1) ∈ Hu. A obtains a challenge
signature which was signed by one of the users, i0 or i1,
on the challenge message. In the guess stage, the adver-
sary tries to guess the signer of the challenge signature.
It is clearly explained in the below experiment.
Definition 4. For security parameter λ and any
PPT adversary A, selfless-anonymity experiment
Expanon-bA (λ) is defined as follows.
Expanon-bA (λ)
(gpk, gmsk)← Setup(λ,N, d);
(aux,m, i0, i1)← A(play : Adduser, Getusk, Gsign,
Revoke);
If i0 ∈ Cu or i1 ∈ Cu, then return 0;
b
$←− {0, 1}, σ ← Sign(gpk,m, secib , certib , t);
b′ ← A(guess, aux, σ;Qgm, Gsign, Getusk, Getreg);
If b = b′, then return 1;
return 0;
We say that our scheme is selfless-anonymous if
the advantage
Advanon-bA (λ) := |Pr[Expanon-bA (λ)]−
1
2
| is negligible for A.
E. Lattices and Discrete Gaussian
Let (bi)i≤n be a set of linearly independent basis vectors
belonging to Rn, the lattice Λ is the set of all integer
linear combination of basis vector i.e.,
Λ(b1, b2, . . . , bn) = {xibi : xi ∈ Z}
We work on q − ary lattices, which are defined below.
Definition 5. For a prime q ≥ 2, matrix A ∈ Zn×mq
where m ≥ n ≥ 1, define following three lattice,
Λq(A) = {e ∈ Zm : ∃x ∈ Znq s.t. A
Tx = e mod q}
Λ⊥q (A) = {x ∈ Zm : Ax = 0 mod q}
For any u ∈ Znq ,
Λuq (A) = {x ∈ Zm : Ax = u mod q}
For a lattice Λ, a vector c ∈ Rn and σ ∈ R+ define
the function, ρσ,c(x ) = exp(−π ||x−c||
2
σ2 ). The discrete
Gaussian distribution over the lattice Λ with centre c




x ∈ Λ and ρσ,c(Λ) =
∑
x∈Λ ρσ,c(x ). We use DΛ,σ(x ) to
indicate the distribution centered in c=0.
In the following lemma, we review several well-known
facts about discrete Gaussian distribution:
Lemma 1 ([25], Lemma 2.11, [13], Lemma 2.10). Let n
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1. For all but a 2q−n fraction of all A ∈ Zn×mq , for
x←↩ DZm,σ, the distriution of u = Ax is statistically
close to unifrom over Znq . Moreover, the conditional
distribution of x given u is DΛuq(A),σ.
2. For β = dσ logme, and x←↩ DZm,σ, Pr[‖x‖∞ > β]
is negligible.
3. The min-entropy of DZm,σ is at least m− 1.
From the above lemma, it is clear that samples ob-
tained from discrete Gaussian distribution over a lattice
Λ are short with overwhelming probability. This fact is
used extensively in our construction.
Lemma 2 ([26], Theorem 3.2). GenTrap is a PPT al-
gorithm on input integers m ≥ n ≥ 1 and q ≥ 2 such that
m ≥ Ω(n log q) outputs a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq and a basis
TA of Λ
⊥
q (A). The distribution of A is within statistical




Using GenTrap algorithm one can obtain a trapdoor
(short basis) for lattice generated by a matrix.
Lemma 3 ([27], Lemma 3). ExtRandBasis is a PPT
algorithm on input a matrix B ∈ Zn×m′q , A1 = [A|B] ∈
Zn×(m+m
′)
q whose first m columns span Znq , a ba-
sis TA ∈ Zm×m of a lattice Λ⊥q (A), a real σ ≥
‖T̃A‖ω(
√
logm) outputs a random basis TA1 of Λ
⊥
q (A1)
satisfying ‖T̃A1‖ ≤ ‖T̃A‖
Using ExtRandBasis algorithm, one can obtain a
trapdoor for any A1 whose left n × m submatrix is
A ∈ Zn×mq , with a known trapdoor T A.
Lemma 4 ([13], Theorem 4.1). SampleD is a PPT al-
gorithm that takes a basis TA ∈ Zm×m of a lattice Λ, a
real σ ≥ ‖T̃A‖ω(
√
logm) and a vector u ∈ Znq outputs
a vector x ∈ Λ sampled according to DZm,σ such that
Ax = u
Using SampleD algorithm, one can obtain a lattice
vector sampled according to the discrete Gaussian dis-
tribution using trapdoor of the lattice.
Lemma 5 ([17], Lemma 5, [19] Proposition 6).
SuperSamp is a PPT algorithm on input integers m ≥
n ≥ 1 and q ≥ 2 such that m ≥ Ω(n log q), as well
as A ∈ Zn×mq and C ∈ Zn×nq outputs an almost uni-
form matrix B ∈ Zn×mq such that AB
T = C and a ba-
sis TB of Λ
⊥






F. Lattice-Related Computational Problems
The security of our scheme relies on the hardness of
two lattice problems: Learning With Errors (LWE) and
Short Integer Solutions (SIS). A variant of SIS is called
Inhomogeneous Short Integer Solutions (ISIS).
Definition 6. Learning With Errors(LWEn,q,χ) [28]
Let χ be a distribution over Z and let n,m ≥ 1, q ≥ 2.
For a vector s ∈ Znq ,As,χ is a distribution of (a,aTs + e)
over (Znq ,Zq), where a ←↩ Znq , e ←↩ χ. The LWEn,q,χ
problem asks to distinguish m samples chosen according
to As,χ (s chosen uniformly) and m samples chosen ac-
cording to uniform distribution over (Znq ,Zq).
For a prime power q, b ≥
√
nω(log n), and distribu-
tion χ, solving LWEn,q,χ problem is at least as hard as
solving SIV Pγ(Shortest Independent V ector Problem),
where γ = O(nqb ) [29]
Definition 7. Short Integer Solutions(SISn,m,q,β) [29,
28] Let m,β, q be parameters polynomial in n. Given m
uniformly random vectors ai ∈ Znq , forming the columns
of a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq , find a nonzero vector x ∈ Zm
such that ‖x‖∞ ≤ β and Ax = 0 .
For any m,β = poly(n) and for any q ≥
√
nβ, solving
SISn,m,q,β problem with non-negligible probability is at





To hide member secret key expiration date τ ,
0/1-Encoding technique is used. This encoding technique
reduces the greater than predicate to the set intersection
predicate [30]. Let x = {xkxk−1 . . . x0} ∈ {0, 1}k be a k
bit binary string. The 0-Encoding of x denoted 0-Enc(x)
is the set of binary strings defined as below,
0-Enc(x) = {xkxk−1 . . . xi+11|xi = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ k}
The 1-Encoding of x, denoted 1-Enc(x) is the set of
binary strings defined as below,
1-Enc(x) = {xkxk−1 . . . xi|xi = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ k}
In 0-Enc(x)/1-Enc(x) bit length of each binary strings is
different and it varies from 1 to k. Also both the encoding
have at most k elements.
If we encode x into 1-Enc(x) and y into 0-Enc(y), we
can see that
x > y ⇐⇒ 1-Enc(x) and 0-Enc(y) has a common element
Lets take an example. Let x = 22 = 101102 and
y = 17 = 100012 of bit length 5(if needed we fill
leading zero’s to make both binary strings of same
length), then 1-Enc(x) = {1011, 101, 1} and 0-Enc(y) =
{11, 101, 1001}. Since 1-Enc(x) ∩ 0-Enc(y) = {101} we
can say x > y. If x = 17 = 100012 and y = 22 = 101102,
then 1-Enc(x) = {10001, 1} and 0-Enc(y) = {11, 10111}.
Since 1-Enc(x) ∩ 0-Enc(y) = ∅ we can say x ≤ y.
Theorem 1 ([30], Theorem 1). x is greater than y if and
only if 1-Enc(x) and 0-Enc(y) have a common element.
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
Security parameter is denoted by λ > 0 everywhere and
the maximum number of members in a group as N =
2l ∈ poly(λ). Then choose lattice parameter n = O(λ),
prime modulus q = O(ln3), dimension m ≥ Ω(n log q),
Gaussian parameter σ = Ω(
√
n log q log n), infinity norm
bound β = σω(logm), ḿ = 2ndlog qe. Following are
the random oracles used in our scheme, H : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1, 2}t, H1 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}2m, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Znq ,
and H3 : {0, 1}∗ → Zm×nq .
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A. Setup(λ,N, d)
• Generate three instances of hard random lat-
tices (A,T A), (C ,T C ), and (P
′,T P ′) using
GenTrap(n,m, q) algorithm. Sample P uniformly
over Zn×nq and run Supersamp(n,m, q,C ,P) to ob-
tain (B ,T B ) such that CB
T = P mod q.
• Sample the following matrices uniformly,
A1,A2,C 1,C 2,C 3 over Zn×mq , D over Zn×ḿq , D0
over Z2n×2ḿq , D1 over Z2n×2mq , F over Z4n×4mq .
Sample the vectors (b1, . . . , bm′ ,u) uniformly over
Znq .
• gpk = (A,A1,A2,B ,C ,C 1,C 2,C 3,D ,D0,D1,
P ,P ′,F , {bj}m
′
j=1,u) and gmsk = (T A,T C ,T P ′)
B. Join(Ui,GM)
Join is an interactive protocol between user Ui and group
manager GM.
• User Ui who possess a key-pair (upk[i], usk[i]) of a
digital signature scheme and performs the following
steps:
– Sample z i according to DZ4m,σ and compute v i =
Fz i mod q ∈ Z4nq . The binary representation
of v i, denoted by bin(v i) consists of 4ndlog qe =
2 · 2ndlog qe = 2ḿ bits.
– Generate the digital signature sigi on syndrome
v i using usk[i] and send (v i, sigi, upk[i]) to GM.
• Upon receiving (v i, sigi, upk[i]), GM checks whether
sigi is a valid signature using upk[i]. If it is a
valid signature, GM proceeds and performs follow-
ing steps:
– Choose an identity i ∈ [N ] and compute an iden-
tity dependent matrix Ai as
Ai = [A|A1 + iA2] ∈ Zn×2mq
and compute short basis T Ai for Λ
⊥
q (Ai) using
ExtRandBasis(Ai,TA, [A1 + iA2], σ).
– τi ∈ N is the secret-key expiration date for Ui.
Let τi
′ = [τia
′||τib′] = H1(τi) ∈ {0, 1}2m, where
τia
′, τib
′ ∈ {0, 1}m. Compute C iτ ′i = f i mod q ∈
Znq , where C i = [C |C 1 + iC 2] ∈ Zn×2mq .
– Choose si ←↩ DZ2m,σ and compute d i =
[d i1||d i2] ∈ Z2m using SampleD(T Ai ,u +
Dbin(w i) + f i, σ) algorithm such that
Aid i = u + Dbin(w i) + f i mod q and ‖d i‖∞ ≤ β
(1)
where, w i = D0bin(v i) + D1si mod q ∈ Z2nq .
– Let bin(τi) ∈ {0, 1}m
′
, then 1-Enc(τi) =
{τi1, ...., τir}, where 1 ≤ r ≤ m′. Let j be the
length of binary string τij in 1-Enc(τi) set. By
definition j is different for each binary string in
encoding set . A fixed vector bj is used for j
length τij .
For each j ∈ [r], compute H2(τij) = τ ′ij ∈ Znq and
generate
∗ x j ← SampleD(TC, bj −Pτ ′ij , σ) such that
Cx j + Pτ
′
ij = bj and ‖x j‖∞ ≤ β (2)
∗ x ′j ← SampleD(TP′ , τ ′ij , σ) such that
P ′x ′j = τ
′
ij and ‖x ′j‖∞ ≤ β (3)
– Revocation token, grti=Ad i1 mod q and send
certi=(i,d i, si, f i, τi, grti, {x j ,x ′j}rj=1) to Ui
• Upon receiving certi, user Ui checks whether eq. (2)
and eq. (3) are satified for all x j ,x
′
j respectively. It
also checks if eq. (1) is satisfied along with ‖d i‖∞ ≤
β, and ‖si‖∞ ≤ β. If all the conditions are satified
Ui sets its secret (signing) key as seci = z i otherwise
abort.
• transcripti = (certi, i, v i, sigi, grti, upk[i]) stored in
transcripts database by GM.
C. Sign(gpk,m , seci, certi, t, RL)
• t is the intermediate signature expiration date such
that t < τi and bin(t) ∈ {0, 1}m
′
. Compute
0-Enc(t) = {t1, ...., tr′} where 1 ≤ r′ ≤ m′.
• Find the binary string for which τij = tj i.e.,
1-Enc(τi) ∩ 0-Enc(t) = τij = tj , let j indicate the
length of binary string τij/tj .
Sample a vector ej ← DZm,σ and compute y j =




j , and b
′′′
j
b ′j = B
TP ′x ′j + y j mod q (4)
b ′′j = Cej mod q (5)
b ′′′j = C 3y j mod q (6)
• Let y1 is uniformly chosen over {0, 1}m and compute
A3 = H3(m , gpk, t, y1). Generate the commitment
for grti as
b = A3grti + e
′ mod q (7)
where e ′ is chosen according to DZm,σ.
• Generate a Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge (NIZK)
protocol Π to prove i ∈ [N ], z i,d i1,d i2, si,x j ,x ′j , e ′
has infinity norm bound β, equations (1),(2), (3)
and (4) are satisfied, and b, b ′′j , b
′′′
j are the correct
committement of grti, ej ,y j respectively. This can
be generated by running protocol in A., t number of
times and convert it into non-interactive using Fiat-
Shamir heuristic [31] i.e., Π = (CMT,CH,RSP )
where,
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D. Verify(gpk,m ,Σ, tc, RL)





Return 1 if all of the below conditions are satisfied
otherwise return 0.
1. Current date tc is less than the signature expira-
tion date t i.e., tc < t
2. Let 0-Enc(t) = {t1, ...., tr′}, where 1 ≤ r′ ≤
m′, and tj be the binary string of length j in











Previous two conditions ensures t < τi.
3. Calculate A3 = H(m , gpk, t, y1). For each uj ∈
RL, compute cj = b −A3uj and return invalid
if any ||cj ||∞ ≤ β.
4. Protocol Π is valid.
E. Open(gpk,m ,Σ, RL)
Like most of the VLR group signatures, we use implicit
tracing algorithm to trace the identity of a signed users.
The implicit tracing algorithm works as follows,
For each i ∈ [N ], run V erify(gpk,m ,Σ, tc, RL=grti)
and return the first index i ∈ [N ] for which it returns 0.
Otherwise return ⊥.
The correctness of our scheme is proved below.
Theorem 2. ∀ d, t, tc, τi, RL,m ∈ {0, 1}∗,
(gpk, gmsk)←Setup(λ,N, d), (seci, certi, grti, τi)←Join.
We have, Verify(gpk,m,Σ, tc, RL) = 1 ⇐⇒ grti /∈
RL and tc ≤ t < τi
Proof: (IF Condition)
Assume, Verify algorithm described in Section (D.) re-
turns 1. We need to prove that grti /∈ RL and tc ≤ t <
τi. If Verify algorithm returns 1 indicates that all the
checks in that algorithm are valid. In verify algorithm
step 1 ensures that tc < t and step 2 indicates that t < τi.
In step 3, infinity norm of all cj is greater that β indi-
cating that grti /∈ RL.
(ONLY IF condition)
Assume, grti ∈ RL and tc ≤ t < τi. We need to
prove that the Verify algorithm described in Section re-
turns 1 with high probability. Verify algorithm returns
1 iff all the steps in that algorithm are valid. Since
tc ≤ t < τi, step 1 and step 2 in verify algorithm are
valid. Let sj = grti − uj for each uj ∈ RL. Since
grti /∈ RL, all sj are non-zero vectors. By Lemma 4 in
[18], Pr[‖A3sj‖∞ ≤ 2β] ≤ negl(n). We know, for each
uj ∈ RL
cj = b −A3uj
= A3grtj + e
′ −A3uj
= A3sj + e
′
Therefore, ‖A3sj‖∞ ≤ ‖cj‖∞ + ‖e ′‖∞. Applying
Lemma 4 in [18], we obtain ‖cj‖∞ > β. So, step 3
in verify algorithm is valid. By completeness property of
protocol Π, step 4 returns valid. Therefore, verify algo-
rithm returns 1 with high probability.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section we show our scheme is traceable, non-
freamable and selfless-anonymous. The security of our
scheme is based on the hardness assumption of LWE
and SIS problem.
A. Traceability
Theorem 3. Our scheme is secure against traceability
attacks based on the hardness of SIS assumption.
proof: Assume, there exists an adversary A breaking
the security of our scheme against traceability with
non-negligible probability. We construct an algorithm
B that solves SIS instance Ā = [Ā1||Ā2||Ā3] ∈ Zn×3mq
with non-negligible probability. A coin is uniformly
chosen over {1, 2} and i∗ $←− [N ] and τi∗ be the secret
key expiration time of user i∗.
coin = 1 : This case handles conditions (1)∧(2) of trace-
ability experiment.
• Setup:
– Assign the matrix A=Ā1,C=Ā3. Run
GenTrap(n,m, q) three times to obtain (A2,T A2),
(C 2,T C2) and (P
′,T ′P ).
– Sample the following matrices uniformly,
D0 over Z2n× ´2mq , D1 over Z2n×2mq , F over Z4n×4mq ,
C 3,P over Zn×mq , R,R




j=1 uniformly over Znq .
– Run SuperSamp(n,m, q,C ,P) to get (B ,T B ).
– Compute A1 = AR − i∗A2, C 1 = CR′ − i∗C 2,
D = Ā2R
′′,u = Ā2e mod q where vector e is
chosen according to DZm,σ




j=1,u) and gmsk=(T A2 ,T C2 ,
T P ′).
• Queries:
– Qgm :Adversary A initiates join protocol by send-
ing (vn, sign, upk[n]), where sign is a valid digital
signature on vn using upk[n] and vn = Fzn.
B Increment n by 1 and fixes a secret key expira-
tion time τn. B computes An = [A|A1 + nA2],
Cn = [C |C 1 + nC 2], H1(τn) = τ ′n, Cnτ ′n = f n.
Using T A2 obtain the vector dn = [dn,1||dn,2]
such that Andn = u + Dbin(D0bin(vn) +
D1sn) + f n mod q where sn is chosen accord-
ing to DZ2m,σ.
Let 1-ENC(τn)={τn1, τn2, . . . , τnr}, for each
τ ′nj=H2(τnj), compute x j using TC and x
′
j
using T ′P. Set grtn = Adn,1, send
certn=(n,dn, sn, f n, τn, grtn, {x j ,x ′j}rj=1) to A,
gskn = zn and add n to the set Cu.
– Gsign: If i /∈ Cu or i = i∗ abort. Otherwise select
an intermediate signature expiration date t such
that t < τi, then generate the signature Σ on
message m with signature expiration date t using
seci. Add (m ,Σ, t) to Sigs
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– Revoke : If i = i∗ abort, otherwise B search in
transcripts list for i to get revocation token grti,
add grti to RL.
– Getreg : On input index i, return (grti, τi) by
searching in transcript database for i.
• Forgery: A outputs (m∗,Σ∗, RL∗) such
that Verify(gpk,m∗,Σ∗, tc
∗, RL∗)=1. If
Open(gpk,m∗,Σ∗, RL∗)=k∈Cu and k 6=i∗ abort.
Otherwise, parse Π∗=(CMT,CH,RSP) and




1). A must have
queried the random oracle H on input




j ) with high
probability. Otherwise,
Pr[{ch}ti=1 = H(CMT ∗,m∗, t∗, j∗, b







Therefore with ε − 3−t probability, there exists an
index κ∗ ≤ QH. At this stage, algorithm B runs
A with same input and random tape as in original
execution. Pick κ∗ as the target point and replay
A many times with the same random tape and in-
put. Each time, first κ∗ − 1 queries are answered
as r1, ...., rκ∗−1 and from κ
∗th query the answers
are uniformly chosen from {1, 2, 3}t. The Improved
Forking Lemma [32] implies that, with probability
greater than 12 , B can obtain a 3-fork involving tuple




j ). Let the answers





























If such k exists, parse the 3-forgeries corresponding







Given three different challenges and three valid re-
sponses for same commitment CMTk, using witness
extraction procedure, extract the witness (k,dk =
[dk1||dk2], z k, sk, f k). Algorithm B aborts if k 6= i∗.
We know Akdk = u + Dbin(wk) + f k mod q where
wk = D0bin(vk) + D1sk.
Akdk = u + Dbin(wk) + f k mod q
[Ā1|Ā1R][dk1||dk2] = Ā2e + Ā2R′′bin(wk)+
[Ā3|Ā3R′][τ ′ka||τ ′kb] mod q
Ā1(dk1 + Rdk2)− Ā2(R′′bin(w j) + e)
− Ā3(τ ′ka + R
′τ ′kb) = 0 mod q
Let x̄ = (dk1 + Rdk2|| − (R′′bin(wk) + e)|| − (τ ′ka +
R′τ ′kb)). Therefore, Āx̄ = 0 mod q and ‖x̄‖ ≤√
m((5m+ 1)β2).
coin = 2 : This case handles conditions (1)∧(3) of trace-
ability experiment.
• Setup:
– Run GenTrap(n,m, q) two times to obtain
(A,T A), (C 2,T C2).
– Sample the following matrices uniformly,
A1,A2,C 1,C 3 over Zn×mq , D over Zn×ḿq , D0
over Z2n× ´2mq , D1 over Z2n×2mq , F over Z4n×4mq ,
R′ over {−1, 1}m×n. An invertible matrix P over
Zn×nq .
Sample the vector u uniformly over Znq .
– For each j ∈ [m′] assign bj = Ā3ej , where ej is
sampled over DZm,σ. Assign C = Ā1
– Choose a binary matrix R1 ∈ {0, 1}n×n such
that its inverse is also a binary matrix. Let







Run SuperSamp(n,m, q,R,Q) to get (P ′,T P ′).




j=1,u) and gmsk=(T A,T C2 ,
T P ′).
• Queries:
– Qgm : AdversaryA initiates join protocol by send-
ing (vn, sign, upk[n]), where sign is a valid digital
signature on vn using upk[n] and vn = Fzn.
B Increment n by 1 and fixes a secret key ex-
piration time τn. B computes An = [A|A1 +
nA2], Cn = [C |C 1 + nC 2], H1(τn) = τ ′n,
Cnτ
′
n = f n. Using T A obtain the vec-
tor dn = [dn,1||dn,2] such that Andn =
u + D(bin(D0bin(vn) + D1bin(sn)) + f n mod q
where sn is chosen according to DZ2m,σ. Let
1-ENC(τn) = {τn1, τn2, . . . , τnr}. For each τ ′nj =
H2(τnj), sample x j according to DZm,σ and us-
ing T P ′ sample x
′
j such that Cx j + Pτ
′
ij = bj
and P ′x ′j = τ
′
ij . Set grtn = Adn,1, send
certn = (n,dn, sn, f n, τn, grtn, {x j ,x ′j}rj=1) to
A, gskn = zn and add n to the set Cu.
– Gsign : If i /∈ Cu or i = i∗ abort. Other-
wise select an intermediate signature expiration
date t such that t < τi generate the signature
Σ on message m with signature expiration time
t using seci . Add (m ,Σ, t) to Sigs.
– Revoke : If i = i∗ abort, otherwise B search in
transcripts list for i to get revocation token grti,
add grti to RL.
– Getreg : On input index i, return (grti, τi) by
searching in transcript list for i.
• Forgery: A outputs (m∗,Σ∗, RL∗) such
that Verify(gpk,m∗,Σ∗, tc
∗, RL∗)=1. If
Open(gpk,m∗,Σ∗, RL∗)=k∈Cu or k 6=i∗ abort.
Otherwise, parse Π∗=(CMT,CH,RSP) and







have queried the random oracle H on input




j ) with high
probability. Otherwise,
Pr[{ch}ti=1 = H(CMT ∗,m∗, t∗, j∗, b







Therefore with ε − 3−t probability, there exists an
index κ∗ ≤ QH. At this stage, algorithm B runs
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A with same input and random tape as in original
execution. Pick κ∗ as the target point and replay
A many times with the same random tape and in-
put. Each time, first κ∗ − 1 queries are answered
as r1, ...., rκ∗−1 and from κ
∗th query the answers
are uniformly chosen from {1, 2, 3}t. The Improved
Forking Lemma [32] implies that, with probability
greater than 12 , B can obtain a 3-fork involving




j ). Let the





























If such j exists, parse the 3-forgeries cor-







k ). Given three different
challenges and three valid responses for same
commitment CMTk, using witness extraction
procedure, the witness (k,x j ,x
′
j) can be extracted.
Algorithm B aborts if j 6= i∗. We know
Cx j + Pτ
′
kj = bj
Ā1x j + Ā2R
′RT
−1
x ′j = Ā3ej
Ā1x j + Ā2R
′RT
−1
x ′j − Ā3ej = 0
Let x̄=(x j ||R′RT
−1
x ′j || − ej). Therefore, Āx̄ = 0




Theorem 4. Our scheme is secure against framing at-
tacks based on the hardness of SIS assumption.
proof: Let A be an adversary that generates a forgery
(m∗,Σ∗, RL∗) which opens to the honest user i∗ who did
not sign the message m∗. We construct an algorithm B
that solves an instance of SIS assumption i.e., given a
matrix Ā ∈ Z4n×4mq as input, algorithm B finds a vector




Setup: Obtain (gpk, gmsk) using Setup(λ,N, d) (de-
scribed in section A.) with one modification. Instead
of uniformly choosing F ∈ Z4n×4mq , we assign F = Ā.
Queries:
• Getgmsk : return gmsk to A
• Quser : Here adversary A corrupts group manager
and engage in join protocol with any honest user
i. At each query, B runs join protocol on behalf of
honest user. After successful join i is added to Hu
set.
• Gsign : If A requests for the signature on mes-
sage m of user i and i ∈ Hu. Select an in-
termediate signature expiry date t such that t <
τi, recall (certi, seci, ) and generate signature us-
ing sign(gpk,m , seci, certi, t, RL) algorithm. Add
(m ,Σ, t) to Sigs.
• Getreg : On input index i, return (grti, τi) by search-
ing in transcript database for i.
• Getusk : On input index i, return the (certi, seci).
Add i to Cu set.
Forgery: Let A outputs (m∗,Σ∗, RL∗, i∗) such that
Verify(gpk,m∗,Σ∗, t∗c , RL
∗)=1 with non-negligible prob-







parse Π∗=(CMT,CH,RSP), Adversary A must
have queried the random oracle H on input




j ) with high probabil-
ity. Otherwise,
Pr[{ch}ti=1 = H(CMT ∗,m∗, t∗, j∗, b







Therefore with ε − 3−t probability, there exists an in-
dex κ∗ ≤ QH. At this stage, algorithm B runs A with
same input and random tape as in original execution.
Pick κ∗ as the target point and replay A many times
with the same random tape and input. Each time, first
κ∗−1 queries are answered as r1, ...., rκ∗−1 and from κ∗th
query the answers are uniformly chosen from {1, 2, 3}t.
The Improved Forking Lemma [32] implies that, with
probability greater than 12 , B can obtain a 3-fork involv-




j ). Let the





























If such k exists, parse the 3-forgeries corresponding to 3-







three different challenges and three valid responses for
same commitment CMTk, using witness extraction pro-
cedure, we obtain the witness (k,dk, z k, sk, f k).
We consider the cases where A returns 1 in framing ex-
periment Expnon−frameA and show that B solves SIS in-
stance.
Open algorithm obtains the vector vk∗ . Recall z i∗
when answering Quser query such that Fz k∗ = vk∗ . We
know vk∗ = Fz k, where z k is obtained using witness
extraction procedure. Due to the statistical witness
indistinguishability of stern extension protocol, z k 6= z i∗
with high probability. Let x̄ = z k − z i∗ . We know
Fx̄ = 0 mod q and ‖x̄‖ ≤ 2β
√
m. Hence x̄ is a solution
to SIS instance
C. Anonymity Attack
Theorem 5. Our scheme is secure against anonymity
attacks based on the zero knowledge property of NIZK
protocol Π, and hardness of LWE assumption.
Game G(b): This game is same as original anonymity
game. In this game, challenger B runs setup algorithm
to generate (gpk, gmsk) and gives gpk to adversary A.
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Challenger B replies to all the queries of the adversary.
After polynomial number of queries , A sends a challenge
message m∗, two legitimate identities (i0, i1) such that
i0 6= i1 . Challenger B selects an identity ib, where b is
uniformly choosen over {0, 1} and generates the chal-







Finally, A outputs the bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Game G
(b)
1 : This game is similar to G
(b), except the
protocol Π∗ is replaced by a simulator output Sim∗.
The transcripts of the protocol Π∗, is simulated using
the simulator of Π∗, the two transcripts Π∗ and Sim∗
are statistically indistinguishable because of the statis-
tical zero knowledge property of Π∗. Hence Challenge
signature generated in this game is computationally




2 : This game is similar to G
(b)
1 , ex-
cept the steps to generate commitment b, b′j are
changed. In game G
(b)
1 , b and b
′
j are computed
as b = A3grti + e1 and b
′
j = B
TP ′x j + y j
respectively. Instead, they are computed as
b = A3s + e1 and b
′
j = B
Ts1 + y j , where s and s1 are
uniformly chosen over Znq . The signature Σ∗ generated
in this game is statistically close to the signature
generated in game G
(b)
1 because of Lemma 1.
Game G
(b)
3 : This game is similar to G
(b)
2 , except
the steps to genrate commitment b′′j , and b
′′′
j are







as b′′j = Cej and b
′′′
j = Dy j respectively. Instead,
b′′j and b
′′′
j are uniformly chosen over Znq . The signature
Σ∗ generated in this game is statistically close to the
signature generated in game G
(b)
1 because of Lemma 1.
Game G4: This game is similar to G
(b)
3 , ex-
cept the steps to genrate commitment b, b′j are
changed. In game G
(b)
3 , b and b
′
j are computed as
b = A3s + e1 and b
′
j = B
Ts1 + y j respectively. Instead,
b and b′j are uniformly chosen over Zmq . Signature Σ∗
generated in this game is statistically close to signature
generated in game G
(b)
3 because of the hardness of
decision version of LWE.
We know the challenge signature Σ∗ generated in the
game Game G4 is independent of the both the user
i0 and i1, and the challenge signature Σ
∗ in the origi-
nal anonimity game is computationally indistinguishable
with the challenge signature Σ∗ generated in the game
Game G4. Therefore advantage of the adversary A is
negligible.
V. CONCLUSION
We have presented a new lattice based dynamic group
signature using VLR by fixing an expiry date for each
signing key. With this feature, any group member whose
signing key has expired is naturally revoked and he can-
not generate a valid group signature after that. Revo-
cation tokens of only prematurely revoked members are
kept in the revocation list. This results in a significantly
smaller revocation list improving the efficiency of the ver-
ification process. Our scheme is particularly efficient in
scenarios where the fraction of premature revocation is
very less compared to natural revocation. Our scheme is
proved to be secure based on the hardness of LWE and
SIS assumptions in the random oracle model.
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APPENDIX
A. Underlying Interactive Zero-Knowledge Argument
System
Let D,L be positive integers. In 2016, Libert et al. [23]
proposed an interactive zero-knowledge protocol for the
relation R defined below.
R = {(P, y ; x) ∈ ZD×Lq × Z
D
q × V alid : Px = y mod q} (8)
where, V alid is the subset of {−1, 0, 1}L satisfying the
following conditions:
x ∈ V alid ⇐⇒ Tπ(x) ∈ V alid (9)
If x ∈ V alid and π is uniform in S then Tπ(x) is uniform in V alid
(10)
where Tπ is the permutation of L elements and set S is
the permutation of m elements.
In this section, we construct an interactive zero-
knowledge protocol that allows the signer to convince
following conditions to the verifier.
1. Signer i is a certified group member i.e, he possess
a valid secret key, seci = z i and a membership cer-
tificate certi = (i,d i, si, f i, τi, grti, {x j ,x ′j}rj=1).
2. x j and x
′
j are the short vectors associated with τ
′
ij .
3. The commitment b ′j obtained using the LWE func-
tion, is the correct commitment of P ′x j .
4. The commitment b ′′j , b
′′′
j is the correct commitment
of ej ,y j .
All the above conditions can be defined as a relation
R′.
Definition 8. : The relation R′ is defined as follows:
R
′ ={A,A1,A2,B,C,C1,C2,C3,D,D0,D1, P, P′, F, {bj}m
′
j=1, u;










j ,ej ,yj ,e}
where
A,A1,A2,B,C,C1,C2,C3, P
′ ∈ Zn×mq ,D ∈ Zn×ḿq ,
D0 ∈ Z2n×
´2m
q ,D1 ∈ Z2n×2mq , F ∈ Z4n×4mq , {bj}m
′
j=1, u ∈ Znq ,
i ∈ [N ], zi ∈ [−β, β]4m, vi ∈ Z4nq , wi ∈ Z2nq , di1, di2 ∈
[−β, β]m, si ∈ [−β, β]2m, τ ′ia, τ ′ib ∈ {0, 1}m, b, ej , yj , xj , x′j
∈ Zm, fi, bj , b′j , b′′j , τ ′ij ∈ Znq .
satisfying
Adi1 + A1di2 + iA2di2 = u + Dbin(wi) + fi























b = A3grti + e








xj + yj mod q and yj = xj + ej
b
′′
j = Cej mod q
b
′′′
j = C3yj mod q
(13)
An interactive zero-knowledge for the relation
R(defined earlier) is already constructed by [23]. An in-
teractive zero-knowledge protocol for the relation R′ can
be generated by transforming the relation R′ to the re-
lation R. The following section describes the steps to
transform R′ to R.
B. Transformation of R′ to R
To transform the relation R′ to R, we transform eq. (11-
13) to the form Px = y mod q, and define a set VALID
and permutation T such that eq. (8-10) is satisfied. Some
sets and matrices which are used in the transformation
are defined below:
1. B3m is the set of all vectors in {−1, 0, 1}3m having
equal number of −1, 0, 1. B2l is the set of all vectors
in {0, 1}2l having hamming weight l.
2. For any α > 0, one can define the sequence
(α1, α2, α3, ...., αp) such that
∑p
i=1 αi = α, where
p = blog βc + 1 [18]. We define a matrix Hm,α =
[α1, α2, α3, ...., αp] ⊗ Im ∈ Zm×mp. Define an-
other matrix H ∗m,α ∈ Zm×3mp which is obtained
by adding 2mp columns to Hm,α.
3. We define the matrix R1 as R1 = I 4n ⊗
[1|2|4|....|2dlog qe−1] and R2 as R2 = I 2n ⊗
[1|2|4|....|2dlog qe−1].
We extensively use the following lemma defined in [33]
for transformation of R to R′ .
Lemma 6. Let m,O be positive integers and δO =
blogOc + 1. On input a vector v ∈ [−O,O]m, ex-
tension and decomposition technique outputs a vector




Conversion of all the equations in Definition 8 into
Px = y mod q proceeds as follows:
Transformation of eq. (11) to the appropriate
form: Let id ∈ {0, 1}l be the binary representation of i
and idj represents the j-th bit of id. Let y1 = bin(v i) ∈
{0, 1}2m and y2 = bin(w i) ∈ {0, 1}m. Equation (11) can
be written as
Adi1 + A1di2 +
l∑
i=1
(2l−iA2) ididi2 − Dy2−









D0y1 + D1si − R2y2 mod q = 0 and
R1y1 − Fz i = 0 mod q
(15)
Apply Lemma 6 to the vectors d i1, d i2 ∈ Zm to gen-
erate the vectors d∗1,d
∗
2 ∈ B3mδβ respectively. Extend
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τ ′ia, τ
′
ib ∈ {0, 1}m to τ̂1, τ̂2 ∈ B2m respectively. Extend
the vector y2 ∈ {0, 1}m to obtain ŷ2 ∈ B2m. Extend
the identity id ∈ {0, 1}l to îd ∈ B2l. Now, eq. (14) is
reduced to
A∗x 11 = u mod q (16)
where,
A







Similarly, eq. (15) is reduced to













K1 = [D0|02n×2m|D1H∗2m,β |(−R2)|02n×m],
K2 = [R1|04n×2m|FH∗4m,β ],
t1 = [ŷ1||s∗i ||ŷ2] and t2 = [ŷ1||z∗i ].
The vectors s∗i ∈ B3(2m)δβ and z ∗i ∈ B3(4m)δβ are ob-
tained by applying Lemma (6) to si ∈ Z2m and z i ∈ Z4m
respectively and ŷ1 is obtained by extending y1 such that
ŷ1 ∈ B4m.
We combine eq. (16) and eq. (17) and obtain to obtain
P∗1x
∗

















Transformation of eq. (12) to the required form:
Equation eq. (13) can be written as,
bj = Cx j + PP
′x ′j (19)
b = A3Ad i1 + e
′ mod q (20)
Apply Lemma 6 to the vectors x j ,x
′
j ∈ Zm to generate
vectors x ∗j ,x
′∗
j ∈ B3mδβ . Now equation 19 reduces to,
K 3t3 = bj (21)
where, K3 = [CH
∗
m,β |PP ′H∗m,β ] and t3 = [x∗j ||x ′∗j ]
Similarly apply Lemma 6 to the vectors e ′ ∈ Zm and to
generate vector e ′∗j ∈ B3mδβ . Now equation 20 reduces
to,
K 4t4 = b (22)
where, K4 = [A3AH
∗
m,β |ImH∗m,β ] and t4 = [d∗1||e∗]
We combine eq. (21) and eq. (22) and obtain to obtain
P∗2x
∗

















Transformation of eq. (13) to the required
form:
Apply Lemma 6 to the vectors y j , ej ∈ Zm to generate
the vectors y∗j , e
∗
j ∈ B3mδβ . Now equation 13 reduces
to,
K 5t5 = b
′
j (24)
K 6t6 = b
′′
j (25)
K 7t7 = b
′′′
j (26)






m,β |ImH∗m,β ] and t5 = [x∗j ||y∗j ]
K6 = CH
∗





m,β and t7 = y
∗
j
We combine eq. (24), (25) and eq. (26) and obtain to
obtain P∗3x
∗
3 = z 3 mod q where
P∗3 =
K 5 0 00 K 6 0




 and z 3 =




Finally we combine equations (18), (23) and (27) to
obtain Px = y mod q
P =









Thus, all the equations in the relation R′ are transformed
to the form Px = y mod q.
Let L = 8m+ (4l + 12)3mδβ . We define a set VALID
as follows:
VALID: Set of all vectors {−1, 0, 1}L of the form
h = [h1||h2||w1h2|| . . . ||w2lh2||h3||h4||h5||w1h5|| . . . ||w2lh5||
h6||h7||h3||h6||h8||h9||h10||h1||h11||h9||h12||h9||h12]
where h1, h2, h9, h10, h11, h12 ∈ B3mδβ , h7 ∈ B3(2m)δβ , h8 ∈
B3(4m)δβ , h3, h4, h5, h6 ∈ B2m, w=[w1w2...w2l]∈B2l.
Let S = S3mδβ × S3mδβ × S3mδβ × S3mδβ × S3mδβ × S3mδβ ×
S3(2m)δβ × S3(4m)δβ × S2l × S2m × S2m × S2m × S2m
Let π = (ρ, π1, π2, π3, π4, π5, π6, π7, π8, π9, π10, π11, π12) ∈
S.





We observe that x belongs to the set VALID and eq.
(8-10) is satisfied. Therefore, the relation R′ (given in
Definition 8) is transformed to the relation R. Thus,
an interactive zero-knowledge protocol for R′ is obtained
directly from the protocol for the relation R, described
in [23].
www.ijcit.com 45
